Non-Cooperative Planning Theory

1: Introduction.- 1. Basic Concepts and Approaches.- 1.1. Planning and Incentives.- 1.2. Decision Theory.- 1.3. Social Choice Theory.- 1.4. Game Theory.- 1.5. Implementation Theory.- 1.6. Agency Theory.- 1.7. An Overview of the Book.- 1.8. Alternative Approaches to Planning.- 1.9. Conclusions.- 2: Information and Communication.- 2. Bayesian Games and Implementation.- 2.1. Introduction.- 2.2. Bayesian Games.- 2.3. Bayesian Games with Communication.- 2.4. The Evaluation of Planning Schemes.- 2.5. Bayesian Implementation and Revelation.- 2.6. Conclusions.- Mathematical Appendix.- 3. Organization of Communication.- 3.1. Introduction.- 3.2. Superior Organizations.- 3.3. More or Less Communication.- 3.4. Simultaneous or Sequential Communication.- 3.5. Prior or Posterior Communication.- 3.6. Contingent or Fixed Decisions.- 3.7. Multiple or Single Issue Decisions.- 3.8. An Example.- 3.9. Conclusions.- Mathematical Appendix.- 3: Delegated Decision Making.- 4. Choice-Implementation Models.- 4.1. Introduction.- 4.2. The Choice-Implementation Problem.- 4.3. The Pure Implementation Problem.- 4.4. Additional Simplifications.- 4.5. The Elimination of Choice-Implementation Preplay.- 4.6. Conclusions.- 5. Sufficient and Robust Information.- 5.1. Introduction.- 5.2. Preliminaries.- 5.3. Sufficient Statistics.- 5.4. The Sufficiency of Sufficient Statistics.- 5.5. The Necessity of Sufficient Statistics.- 5.6. Robust Information Systems.- 5.7. The Robustness of Sufficient Statistics.- 5.8. An Example.- 5.9. Conclusions.- Mathematical Appendix.- 6. Finer, Complete and Ancillary Information.- 6.1. Introduction.- 6.2. Finer Statistics.- 6.3. Complete Statistics.- 6.4. Ancillary Statistics.- 6.5. Conclusions.- Mathematical Appendix.- 7. Non-Verifiable Information.- 7.1. Introduction.- 7.2. Preliminaries.- 7.3. Mean Preserving Spread Increases.- 7.4. The First Order Characterization.- 7.5. The Value of Non-Verifiable Information.- 7.6. The Noah’s Ark Case.- 7.7. A Numerical Example.- 7.8. Conclusions 158 Mathematical Appendix.- 4: Delegated Information Production.- 8. Information Production Models.- 8.1. Introduction.- 8.2. Delegated Production of Verifiable Information.- 8.3. Delegated Production of Non-Verifiable Information.- 8.4. The Information Production Mechanism.- 8.5. Information Production and Information Use.- 8.6. Conclusions.- 9. Incentives in Information Production.- 9.1. Introduction.- 9.2. Private Information and Communication.- 9.3. The Incentive Issue.- 9.4. The Structure of Optimal Incentives.- 9.5. Incentives in Binary Models.- 9.6. Additional Public Information.- 9.7. Additional Private Information.- 9.8. Conclusions.- Mathematical Appendix.- 10. Organization of Information Production.- 10.1. Introduction.- 10.2. Finer Investigations.- 10.3. Parallel Investigations.- 10.4. Parallelism in Binary Model.- 10.5. Sequential Investigations.- 10.6. Conclusions 235 Mathematical Appendix.- 5: Evaluation of Specific Schemes.- 11. Incentives and Productivity Measures.- 11.1. Introduction.- 11.2. OR and Incentives.- 11.3. Data Envelopment Analysis.- 11.4. The Incentive Problem.- 11.5. Sufficient Production Frontiers.- 11.6. An Example.- 11.7. Further Results.- 11.8. Conclusions.- Mathematical Appendix.- 6: Summary and Conclusions.- 12. Summary and Conclusions.- 12.1. Introduction.- 12.2. Related Theories.- 12.3. Information and Communication.- 12.4. Delegated Decision Making.- 12.5. Delegated Information Production.- 12.6. Evaluation of Specific Schemes.- 12.7. Partial and Simplified Models.- 12.8. Conclusions.- Bibliographic Appendix.- References.